The recent distributed denial of service attacks that affected large parts of the internet, along with major online outfits such as Twitter and Netflix, was an eye-opener for those who may not have been familiar with this type of threat. It was also a vindication of sorts for the government’s cybersecurity focus.
Despite the obvious dangers posed by criminals and state-sponsored advanced persistent threats (APTs) that trawl government systems for specific data, DDoS attacks are consistently seen as the biggest potential threat. So much so that the Department of Homeland Security has been spending serious money to develop defenses against it.
That attention seems warranted. The October attack again DNS provider Dyn using the Mirai botnet has raised the stakes significantly, at least in technical terms. Up to 100,000 bots were eventually involved, with the attack volume eventually thought to have exceeded 1 terabit/sec .
That’s a huge number, and a DDoS attack at that level will overwhelm most defenses now in place, simply because they can’t keep up with the deluge that’s flooding them. Mean time to failure of any compromised Internet of Things device -- the means of attack targeted by the Mirai botnet -- is just 10 minutes. You can’t just turn devices off and on again as a way of mitigating attacks.
The IoT, in other words, is a potential mother lode for cyber bad guys. It’s seen as having a tremendous potential to wring value out of assets through improved supply chains and logistics operations. It could mean as much as $1.9 trillion dollars in added value, which is a huge attraction for device manufacturers.
Unfortunately, security so far hasn’t kept up with demand. Two years ago, the SANS Institute detailed the vulnerabilities of digital video recorders as internet-connected devices. Revisiting the situation after the Mirai attack, it found not much has changed.
The ways the IoT can be attacked seem to be endless. One organization has described how Philips smart streetlights can be used to spread worms that result in so-called “bricking” attacks that can shut down the lighting in large areas of a city. Think of the havoc such blackouts can cause. Others have shown that even everyday devices such as smart toasters can be hijacked.
It didn’t take long after the Mirai attack for similar threats to surface. Linux/IRCTelnet malware (based on Aidra botnet) apparently has the same roots as Mirai and also borrows from other botnets. It has the same abilities to attack weak telnet credentials, but can also attack systems running much newer protocols such as IPv6. There are also warnings that new attack vectors such as Lightweight Directory Access Protocol could be used to launch terabit-scale DDoS attacks.
Just as the original Stuxnet attack was seen as the progenitor of much of the sophisticated APT malware industry that’s been built up over the past few years, it’s all but inevitable that the recent success of Mirai will stimulate similar development of DDoS threats.
To counter that, it’s critical that better and more capable tools are developed. Organizations such as DHS are ahead of the game, and after the recent attacks Congress has been stirred to action. Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.), co-founder of the Senate Cybersecurity Caucus, asked the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission and the DHS’s National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center for information on current and future tools that will be needed to bolster IoT security.
DHS is apparently going further by developing a set of strategic principles that will set out security guidelines for connected devices, and calling for manufacturers to integrate more security into their devices. It will be interesting to see how manufacturers react to this, given the tradeoffs behind improving device security and getting devices quickly to market to meet the burgeoning IoT demand.
The chip industry is also getting involved. Much as the Trusted Computing Platform has enabled widespread chip-based security for laptops and other computing devices, so companies such as ARM and Microchip (teaming with Amazon) are looking to provide processor-based security for IoT devices.
All of that will take some time to make its way into the IoT mainstream however. Meanwhile, there are practices organizations can follow now that could lessen the effects of a DDoS attack, such as building up infrastructure resilience and replacing obvious network credentials for devices. The factory default “admin-password,” for example, was just one of the things Mirai looked for.
Posted by Brian Robinson on Nov 08, 2016 at 9:57 AM0 comments
When it comes to cybersecurity and the ability to catch threats in the early stages before they can much damage, where does government stand? Effective, ineffective? Is it at least improving?
The picture over of the past couple of years doesn’t look encouraging. The infamous breach at the Office of Personnel and Management, other noted attacks on the Pentagon and the Internal Revenue Service and minor breaches elsewhere would seem to suggest the government is overwhelmed.
Some analyses seem to confirm that. The Government Accountability Office, for example, recently came out with a report that pointed out the number of cyber incidents affecting federal agencies rocketed to over 77,000 in 2015 compared to just 5,503 in 2006. That’s more than a 1,300 percent increase.
Over the last several years, GAO has made around 2,500 recommendations to agencies intended to help improve their information security controls, GAO Director of Information Security Issues Gregory Wilshusen told the President’s Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity. As of mid-September 2016, 1,000 of those had yet to be implemented.
As the GAO does, Wilshusen then listed a raft of actions agencies should take to improve the protection of their information and systems.
One of the emerging technologies that’s being pitched as a potential advance for security is big data analytics, which can look into the flood of data that’s being collected by various sensors and sort out the patterns that might point to potential security attacks. Even though many are skeptical of data analytics, particularly predictive analytics, it’s one of the more promising technologies government can use to get in front of security problems.
A MeriTalk survey showed that interest in using big data is high in government, with 81 percent of respondents saying their agencies are using it in some capacity, and over 50 percent already have it built into their cybersecurity strategy.
However, only 45 percent of those surveyed said they trusted big data results when it comes to cybersecurity. Nearly 90 percent of them said they had trouble drawing intelligence from the data, and a third of them admitted they still don’t have the right systems in place to gather the information they need even to start applying data analytics.
Read around the figures in the various studies, however, and things look more optimistic. At the least, it seems that the organizational resistance and executive-level inattention that has plagued government cybersecurity finally seem to have been overcome.
As Rocky DeStefano, cybersecurity expert at Cloudera, which sponsored the MeriTalk survey, pointed out, at least there’s interest in improving. The positive you can take away from the survey, two years after a similar one, is that a high percentage of government that is at least starting to use big data analytics, compared to much lower numbers back then.
And people are already reporting encouraging results, DeStefano said, such as 90 percent who have seen some reduction in successful attacks and 84 percent who are able to thwart at least some kinds of attacks by leveraging the results of big data analytics.
“That’s the most encouraging thing to me,” he said. “This is all still in its infancy and yet it’s still very, very effective.”
Outside of the federal arena, optimism in states also seems to be catching on. A report from Deloitte and the National Association of State Chief Information Officers showed an increasing level of awareness of security issues at the executive level, with cybersecurity is becoming “part of the fabric” of government operations.
Even the GAO, usually so critical of government security, had some kind words. While pointing out the faults and inconsistencies of agencies’ security efforts and that additional actions are needed, Wilshusen did tell the presidential commission that the Obama administration and agencies have acted to improve cybersecurity protections.
So it’s a start, but one that must be accelerated into much more effective and wider application. After all, when it comes to technologies like data analytics and other tools that can be used to their advantage, the bad guys have also not been slow to try and take advantage.
Both government and private industry are changing how they approach cybersecurity, DeStefano believes, and it will take patience. Unlike in the past, when security was much more a case of intuition and guesswork, there’s now a cadre of highly-skilled people identifying threats with mechanisms and techniques that can be replicated and improved for the future.
“What’s really happening is that we’re turning an art into a science, and that’s going to take time,” DeStefano said. “When we do that, we’ll be able to get a little more ahead of the game than we are today.”
This blog was changed Oct. 26 to correct the spelling of Mr. DeStefano's name.
Posted by Brian Robinson on Oct 21, 2016 at 12:50 PM0 comments
The National Institute of Standards and Technology has long been a national resource on cybersecurity, and its Cybersecurity Framework has been widely adopted in both government and private industry. The guidance, however, doesn’t come with many pointers to tell organizations how well they are deploying it.
Hearing the many pleas for some way of doing that, NIST has finally come out with a self-assessment tool that should give organizations a better understanding of how they are progressing with security risk management efforts. It’s asking for public comment on the current draft document.
The Baldrige Cybersecurity Excellence Builder pulls together two prized Commerce Department initiatives. The new tool incorporates elements of NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework, which was introduced in February 2014, and takes inspiration from the Baldrige Award, created in 1987 and named after the late Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige.
The award begat the Baldrige Excellence Framework, which organizations can use to build performance-boosting programs. After that came the Baldrige Performance Excellence Program, managed by NIST, that also includes various self-assessment tools that can tell organizations how well they are doing.
As far as the Cybersecurity Framework goes, it’s proving to be as popular as the Baldrige program has been over the years, and there’s hope it might be as effective. Though it has its critics, the Cybersecurity Framework has so far been adopted by around 30 percent of U.S. organizations, according to Gartner, and that’s expected to rise to 50 percent by 2020.
The new assessment tool, according to NIST, guides users through a process that details their particular characteristics and strategic needs for cybersecurity and will enable them to:
- Determine cybersecurity-related activities that are important to business strategy and the delivery of critical services
- Prioritize investments in managing cybersecurity risk
- Assess the effectiveness and efficiency of using cybersecurity standards, guidelines and practices
- Assess cybersecurity results
- Identify priorities for improvement
At the end, the assessment will put the organizations at a certain maturity level -- reactive, early, mature or role model -- and from there, each organization can build out its own action plan for upgrades and cybersecurity improvements.
NIST is looking for comments on the first draft of the guidelines by Dec. 15.
Email security has also long been a focus for NIST, with its Special Publication 800-45 providing basic guidance. However, the most recent version of that guidance was published in early 2007 and the universe of security threats has much larger.
A new missive on Trustworthy Email, SP 800-177, seeks to plug the holes. Billed as complementary to 800-45, it provides more up to date recommendations for managing digital signatures, encryption, spam and more.
Man-in-the-middle attacks have become widespread, for example, as a way for bad actors to put themselves between the sender and receiver of a clear-text email so they can get information directly from the email. The NIST publication points out that these attacks can be prevented by encrypting email end-to-end and by implementing message-based authentication and confidentiality procedures.
There’s nothing especially new in the NIST email guidance, but even the basic recommendations mentioned in the document are often not implemented at organizations. Trustworthy Email should be useful, if for nothing else, for bringing all the current standard methods of protecting email together into a focused resource for email and network administrators and information security managers.
Posted by Brian Robinson on Sep 29, 2016 at 9:27 AM0 comments
When the data breaches at the Office of Personnel Management were revealed in 2015, it took some time for people to come to terms with the damage that had been wrought. In the end, over 20 million government employee and contractor records were compromised and OPM executives lost their jobs. It may be years before everything gets sorted out.
The report released Sept. 7 by the Republican majority staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform claims that the loss of background investigation information and fingerprint data “will harm counterintelligence efforts for at least a generation to come.”
That’s unlikely to be the last word. The Democrats on the committee have already rejected at least some part of the report, claiming factual deficiencies and insufficient blame attached to federal contractors. OPM asserts the report doesn’t reflect how much progress it has made on security since the breaches were discovered.
Nevertheless, the report is the most comprehensive official account to date of what happened at OPM, and in its details it presents what could turn out to be both a model for what not to do and a template for how to design security to prevent future breaches.
The first lesson: When you get advice from knowledgeable sources, you should really take it. As far back as 2005, the OPM inspector general warned that agency data was vulnerable to hackers. The risk was upgraded to a “significant deficiency” in 2014. Even as recently as November 2015, months after the breach was revealed, the IG was still complaining that OPM was not meeting the requirements of the Federal Information Security Management Act and that the agency’s IT security program wasn’t in compliance.
Then look at the failure to implement basic security requirements, even when the mandate for doing so had been around for a while. OPM used multifactor authentication for only a very small fraction of its staff, despite a policy from the Office of Management and Budget issued several years before the breach. OPM also allowed key IT systems to operate without a security assessment and a valid authority to operate.
There’s also a lesson to be learned about overconfidence. The DHS Computer Emergency Response Team notified OPM as early as March 2014 that someone was snatching data from its network. The OPM then monitored that hacker for two months to get a better idea of the threat.
Fair enough, except that by focusing on that first hacker, OPM missed another who, posing as a contractor, installed malware and created a backdoor. The agency eventually tackled the threat posed by the first hacker, but the second hacker went unnoticed and remained in the system. OPM thought it had cleared its systems, but it overlooked the remaining hacker who successfully stole data.
“Had OPM implemented basic, required security controls and more expeditiously deployed cutting edge security tools when they first learned hackers were targeting such sensitive data,” the House report said, “they could have significantly delayed, potentially prevented or significantly mitigated the theft.”
In fact, the agency did use tools from Cylance Inc., but only after the breach caused by the second hacker was identified. In just the six weeks following that discovery, from April 16, 2015 through to the end of May, the tools “consistently detected malicious code and other threats to OPM,” the report said. Unfortunately OPM’s security director had recommended using the Cylance tools way back in March 2014, after the discovery of the first hack.
OPM, to its credit, seems to have hustled to repair both its security and, though it may take a long time, its reputation. Acting Director Beth Cobert has laid out a series of steps the agency has taken, including imposing multifactor authentication for anyone accessing the agency network, shoring up the web-based systems used to get information for employee background investigation, implementing the government’s continuous monitoring program and working with the Defense Department to construct a new IT infrastructure for background checks.
Notably, OPM has also brought on a “senior cybersecurity advisor” who reports directly to OPM’s director, among a number of other IT and security changes. It’s also centralized cybersecurity resources and responsibilities under a new chief information security officer.
That’s as important as any security technology OPM will use. As the House reports notes, the breaches at OPM represent “a failure of culture and leadership, not technology.” The security tools that could have prevented the breaches were available, but OPM failed to recognize their importance.
Though the OPM hack itself is over, it could take years for the repercussions to subside, particularly the ongoing threat to government employees because of the personal information that was stolen. It could also cause lasting damage to U.S. counterintelligence efforts.
The publication of the House report, and its damning details, should lead to major reforms in how agencies tackle cybersecurity. If those reforms don’t come about after what is widely considered one of the biggest security failures ever, then you have to wonder what it will take.
Posted by Brian Robinson on Sep 09, 2016 at 11:52 AM0 comments