Protect elections by prioritizing public awareness of cyber defenses

As state and local governments prepare for primary and general elections, chief information security officers face both an elevated risk of cyberattack as well as growing misinformation and foreign influence activities. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s cybersecurity toolkit to protect elections features a repository of tools to help state and local election officials enhance their cyber resilience using their existing capabilities. However, the threat of mis-, dis- and mal-information (MDM) presents a communication challenge as much as a cyber one. 

At this point in the electoral cycle, with time and funding running out to implement new cyber technologies, state and local leaders must work with what they have –– and what they have is enough allow them to focus on educating the electorate about the measures in place to ensure the integrity of voting. It is important to do this before adversaries and cybercriminals claim to have attacked election infrastructure and to have altered votes or even electoral outcomes.  

In the short term, building public awareness of cyber defenses by “pre-bunking” or preemptively debunking false claims can help prevent MDM campaigns from taking hold among the public. 

The growing threat of mis-, dis- and malinformation   

In recent years, foreign adversaries have escalated efforts to disrupt the democratic process, using MDM campaigns to cause chaos, confusion and division and undermine faith in the security of state and local elections. Amid the ongoing threat of ransomware attacks from state actors and cybercriminals alike, CISOs are under pressure to bolster constituents’ confidence in the integrity of the voting process. These threats can be daunting for local governments doing their best with limited cyber and budgetary resources. 

Cybersecurity measures are often grouped into the categories of people, processes and technology. There are several security technologies and processes such as zero trust network access that state and local government can implement to help protect their systems from attack –– both on Election Day and on every other day of the year.  

But many states have already spent much or all of the federal funding allocated to them under the Help America Vote Act. With no funding dedicated to election security in last year’s Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and with guidance from CISA still pending on how state and local governments can use the IIJA’s cyber grants, further investment in cybersecurity technology likely will have to wait until a future election cycle. 

With only weeks before the midterms, greater improvement to governments’ election security postures are likely to result from process-focused actions such as cybersecurity training of election officials and communicating to the public about the cybersecurity measures in place along with institutional and process measures to ensure electoral integrity.  

The evolving landscape of election security 

The threat to U.S. election infrastructure has changed significantly in recent years, and state and local cyber and IT leaders must evolve their message to the public in kind. 

Attacks on election infrastructure can be perpetrated by a range of threat actors with different motivations. Some, like the 2016 hack of the Democratic National Committee and the presidential campaign of Hillary Clinton to steal and leak secrets, are attacks on American democracy perpetrated by hostile state-sponsored groups, typically masquerading as criminals or cyber activists (“hacktivists”).  

Other attacks target the kind of personal data included in election databases that make them appealing to cybercriminals for purposes such as identity theft or fraud. For example, in August 2016, a security failure in the Georgia voter registration database left the records of more than 6.7 million people vulnerable to cyberattacks and data breaches. Following a 2016 attack on the California primary, cybercriminals gained access to voter registration data and changed voters' party affiliations, preventing some voters from voting and creating chaos and confusion at the polls.

Lessons learned following these attacks have informed agencies’ evolving approach to election security best practices. Today’s election cybersecurity tools are focused not only on ensuring that voter data is safe and that any changes are immutably recorded, but also on showcasing these safeguards to the public. 

Building TRUST among voters 

To counter MDM and strengthen public confidence in elections, CISA and the Election Integrity Information Sharing and Analysis Center recommend using the TRUST model: 

Tell your story, Ready your team, Understand and assess MDM, Strategize response and Track outcomes. When it comes to addressing voters’ concerns around cyberattacks on the midterm elections, much of this work can be done ahead of time. 

Agencies must try to shape the cyber narrative by pointing to their adherence to proven cybersecurity protocols, best practices and the use of security technologies with strong anomaly detection, anti-tampering and audit capabilities. They must show that they are applying the full range of people, process and technology to safeguarding the electoral process and voters’ information. 

In addition to preparing their cyber defenses and teams, state CISOs should be ready to communicate these capabilities to the public throughout the year, not just as election season approaches. They should anticipate the kinds of claims threat actors might make and work to pre-bunk them with a clear and consistent response –– both internally among their workforce and externally to constituents. Finally, they need to deliver clear reporting following the election to support the message of transparency and integrity of the electoral rocess and outcome.

For example, a jurisdiction that employs a firewall with an audit log and anti-tampering technology is well positioned to counter an MDM campaign that suggests voter registration information was altered to add voters to the roll or change the content of ballots tallied. Before threat actors have the chance to sow doubt among the community, a CISO or election official can lay out what an attacker cannot do given the jurisdiction’s suite of cyber defense capabilities and  reiterate this message throughout the election season. 

Combatting MDM has become a core security concern in ensuring the integrity of our elections. Foreign adversaries have found conducting MDM campaigns to be effective than actually perpetrating successful cyberattacks on election infrastructure. By prioritizing public awareness of cyber defenses and communicating and validating the processes and technologies that undergird election security, state and local cyber leaders can thwart malign foreign influence activities before they can take hold.